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Abstract
In this paper, we formulate a method for minimising the expectation
value of the procurement cost of electricity in two popular spot markets:
day-ahead and intra-day, under the assumption that expectation value of
unit prices and the distributions of prediction errors for the electricity
demand traded in two markets are known. The expectation value of the
total electricity cost is minimised over two parameters that change the
amounts of electricity. Two parameters depend only on the expected unit
prices of electricity and the distributions of prediction errors for the elec-
tricity demand traded in two markets. That is, even if we do not know
the predictions for the electricity demand, we can determine the values of
two parameters that minimise the expectation value of the procurement
cost of electricity in two popular spot markets. We demonstrate numeri-
cally that the estimate of two parameters often results in a small variance
of the total electricity cost, and illustrate the usefulness of the proposed
procurement method through the analysis of actual data.
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1 Introduction
In recent years, many power exchanges, such as the Japan Electric Power eX-
change (JEPX), Amsterdam Power Exchange, European Power EXchange Spot
and PJM Interconnection L.L.C., have been involved in the transfer of energy.
These power exchanges offer platforms for trading several electricity markets.
We focus our attention to two popular spot markets: day-ahead and intra-day.
The day-ahead market trades electricity one day before delivery, whereas the
intra-day market trades electricity on the day of delivery.
In practice, it is important for bidders to make a profits as frequently as
possible. An accurate forecast of the unit price of electricity may be helpful to
increase profits. Many researchers use statistical models or machine learning
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to forecast the unit price of electricity (e.g., [3], [7], [10], [1] and [14].) An-
other method to increase profits is strategic bidding, that is, a simulation of the
decision-making process of participants in a market. For example, [8] studied
a methodology to obtain the optimal bidding strategy for generation compa-
nies that participate in electric power markets. Additionally, [13] considered
a coevolutionary approach to estimate individual and cooperative strategies of
buyers in a power market.
The total electricity cost also depends on the prediction accuracy of energy
consumption because the amount of electricity traded in markets is determined
by the result of a prediction. As described above, electricity is mainly traded in
the day-ahead and intra-day markets. Trading in these two markets should occur
in a particular order: bidders trade the estimated total amount of electricity in
the day-ahead market and then trade in the intra-day market if the estimated
amount of electricity traded in the day-ahead market is not expected to supply
the total demand. The unit price of the day-ahead market is usually less than
that of the intra-day market. Thus, high prediction accuracy in the day-ahead
market may increase profits.
In practice, however, the prediction in the day-ahead market can often be
unstable because of the uncertainty of energy consumption. As a result, the
procurement cost of electricity highly depends on the prediction error of energy
consumption. Therefore, the amount of electricity traded in the two markets
must be determined according to the distribution of the prediction error. A few
researchers have discussed bidding strategies based on the prediction error from
a wind power producer’s point of view [2] and [9]. These authors minimised the
expectation value of the total cost of electricity demand.
However, the methods proposed by [2] and [9] have three critical problems.
First, the authors estimated the expectation value of the total electricity cost not
according to the distribution of the prediction error but according to summary
statistics of historical aggregate energy output data, which implies that their
methods can lead to an inappropriate expectation value of the total electricity
cost. The second problem is that the variance of the total electricity cost,
which is calculated by a distribution of the prediction error, cannot be obtained
using the authors’ methods. Third, the authors’ methods cannot be applied to
multiple electricity markets that are traded in a particular order because their
methodologies were developed based on a single market.
To overcome the aforementioned problems, we formulate a method for min-
imising the expectation value of the procurement cost of electricity. Our pro-
posed method can be used when the unit prices (or the expectation values of
the unit prices) of electricity purchased in the two markets and those of sup-
plemental electricity purchased at the time of delivery are provided beforehand
(for research on the prediction of the spot price, see the references in [3] and
[10].) The distributions of the prediction error of the electricity demand traded
in both day-ahead and intra-day markets are taken into account. A numerical
integration or Monte Carlo simulation can be used to obtain the expectation
value of the total electricity cost. For the Monte Carlo simulation, the variance
of the cost can also be computed. The expectation value of the total electric-
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ity cost (i.e., the procurement cost) is minimised over two parameters, which
modify the amounts of electricity to be purchased in the two markets. To show
the effectiveness of our proposed procedure, we compute the expectation value
and variance of the total electricity cost for various values of tuning parame-
ters when the prediction error follows a normal distribution. We demonstrate
numerically that our proposed method results in a smaller variance of total elec-
tricity cost than a procurement method that does not take the prediction errors
into account. The usefulness of the proposed procedure is illustrated through
the analysis of actual data.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: in Section 2, we explain
the day-ahead and intra-day markets and the penalty paid for the purchase of
supplemental electricity at the time of delivery. In Section 3, we present our
procurement method that prescribes the amounts of electricity purchased from
the two markets, derive the expected total cost of electricity and express the
expectation value of this cost in terms of probability distribution functions of the
prediction error. In Section 4, we report the results of a numerical calculation
in which we minimise this expectation value over the two parameters, assuming
that the distributions of prediction errors follow normal distributions with mean
zero. In Section 5, we apply our method to actual data and demonstrate that
the procurement cost can be improved by employing our procurement method.
2 Electricity markets and the penalty paid for
supplemental purchase
In this section, we explain the day-ahead market, intra-day market and the
penalty for supplemental purchase.
JEPX is one of the most popular electric power exchanges in Japan. It
operates several electricity exchange markets. We consider participation in two
of these markets: day-ahead and intra-day. In the day-ahead market, electricity
to be delivered on the following day is purchased, and in the intra-day market,
electricity to be delivered on that day is purchased. The delivery schedule of
electricity for a given day is divided into 48 periods that consist of 30 minutes
each. The first period is from midnight to 0:30 a.m. and the final period is from
11:30 p.m. to midnight. For example, if some amount of electricity is procured
for the 25th period in the day-ahead market, then that amount is designated
for delivery on the next day between noon to 0:30 p.m, whereas if it is procured
for the 25th period in the intra-day market, then it is designated for delivery
on that day between noon and 0:30 p.m.
Suppose we are purchasing electricity for delivery on a given day. We refer to
this day as the “day of delivery.” Then, if for delivery in the t-th period, amount
e1 is procured in the day-ahead market on the previous day and amount e2 is
procured in the intra-day market on the delivery day, then we have e1 + e2
of electricity available for delivery in the t-th period on the delivery day. The
actual amount of demand for electricity during this period may be more or less
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than this amount. We denote this demand by f(t).
Next, we discuss the procedures followed to manage a mismatch between
the amount procured and amount demanded in the cases of f(t) > e1 + e2 and
f(t) < e1 + e2. When f(t) > e1 + e2, the surplus amount of electricity, e1 + e2−
f(t), is acquired by an electric company (a general electricity transmission and
distribution company). In the case of f(t) < e1 + e2, this company provides the
(necessary) supplemental amount f(t)− e1 + e2 and charges a penalty for this
service.
In this paper, considering electricity procured for a given period of delivery,
we assume the following relations among unit prices:
day-ahead unit price < intra-day unit price < penalty unit price . (1)
However, there are cases in which the penalty unit price is less than one or
both market unit prices, and the above inequality does not hold: The intra-day
unit price is less than the day-ahead unit price. Assuming that the penalty unit
price is the highest price is equivalent to assuming that the market is functioning
properly in accordance with the “planned-value power balancing system” (see
e.g., [6]). Indeed, if the penalty unit price was lower than the market unit
prices, then foregoing participation in the markets and simply procuring all
electricity as supplemental purchases and paying the resulting penalties would
result in the lowest procurement cost. However, this would place a large burden
on power generation facilities; that is, it would not be in accordance with the
planned-value power balancing system. Additionally, relying mainly on the
intra-day market for procurement would place a similarly large burden on power
generation facilities. For these reasons, we assume the relations (1). However,
it should be noted that this assumption does not have a significant effect on
the results obtained in this work. We only use this assumption as a condition
in the simulations reported below. With this assumption, following the method
proposed, most electricity is procured in the day-ahead market.
Assuming that we do not have access to a large storage cell, we are not
able to store electricity, and for this reason, we wish to avoid the scenario in
which we procure an amount of electricity that exceeds demand. However,
given the aforementioned relation among unit prices, we also wish to avoid
paying penalties. It is necessary that we attempt to optimally balance these
two undesirable scenarios because there is always uncertainty in our prediction
of demand. For this reason, devising a procurement method for minimising the
procurement cost that accounts for this uncertainty is very important for the
proper functioning of electricity markets.
3 Proposed method
In this section, we explain the proposed procurement method and derive the
procurement cost for the total quantity of electricity procured using this method
for delivery during the t-th period of the delivery day. Then, we express the
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expectation value of this cost in terms of probability distributions that represent
the errors in the demand predictions.
3.1 Procurement method
The proposed procurement method takes as its input predictions for demand,
f(t), in the t-th period on the day of delivery. These predictions are made at
two times: once during the day-ahead market and once during the intra-day
market. With these predictions, using two parameters A and B that account
for the effect of the error in these predictions and the differences among the unit
prices, our method yields optimal procurement amounts in the day-ahead and
intra-day markets.
Let g(t) denote the prediction for f(t) made at the time of procurement
in the day-ahead market; hereafter, the “previous-day prediction.” Then, to
hedge against the uncertainty in this prediction, we add some amount A(t) and
procure the amount g(t) + A(t) in the day-ahead market. The quantity A(t)
is to be chosen in such a manner that optimally accounts for the uncertainty
in g(t) and the differences among the unit prices for the three approaches of
procuring electricity.
Next, let h(t) denote the prediction for f(t) made at the time of procurement
in the intra-day market; hereafter, the “same-day prediction.” Then, in the
intra-day market, electricity is procured such that the sum of the amounts
procured in the two markets is h(t) +B(t), where B(t) is a quantity that plays
the same role here as A(t) plays in the day-ahead market. However, in the case
that h(t)+B(t) is less than the amount of electricity procured in the day-ahead
market, this is obviously not possible. In this case, no electricity is procured in
the intra-day market.
3.2 Procurement cost
In this subsection, we derive the total cost of the amount of electricity procured
using the method described in Section 3.
Let a denote the unit price for the t-th period in the day-ahead market.
Because we always consider the t-th period in the following discussion, from
this point, we will generally omit the argument t for the various quantities
considered. Then, because the amount procured in the day-ahead market is
g +A, the cost of this procurement is
C1 = (g +A)a . (2)
Next, let b denote the unit price for the t-th period in the intra-day market.
Then, because the sum of the amounts procured in the two markets is h+B, if
g + A ≤ h + B, then the amount procured in the intra-day market is h + B −
(g + A), whereas if g + A ≥ h+ B, then the amount procured in the intra-day
market is zero. Thus, the cost of procuring electricity in this market is
C2 = δ(g +A ≤ h+B)(h+B − g −A)b , (3)
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where δ(∗) = 1 if condition ∗ is satisfied; otherwise, δ(∗) = 0 .
C1 + C2 is the combined cost of electricity procured in the two markets.
To obtain the total procurement cost, we must also calculate the penalty paid
for supplemental electricity, which we denote by C3. There are two separate
scenarios in which we must purchase supplemental electricity: that in which
the condition g + A ≤ h + B ≤ f is satisfied and that in which the condition
h + B < g + A ≤ f is satisfied. Then, with c denoting the unit price for the
penalty, the total amount we pay for the penalty is
C3 = δ(g +A ≤ h+B ≤ f)(f − h−B)c
+ δ(h+B < g +A ≤ f)(f − g −A)c . (4)
Collecting the above results, the total procurement cost for electricity deliv-
ered in the t-th period on the day of delivery is C = C1 + C2 + C3.
3.3 Expectation value of the procurement cost
In this subsection, we obtain an expression for expectation value E[C] of pro-
curement cost C calculated in Subsection 3.2 in terms of probability distribu-
tions that represent the errors in the demand predictions.
G = f−g and H = f−h are assumed to be random variables, and we denote
the distribution functions of these variables by PG(x) and PH(y), respectively.
We assume that f and (a, b, c) are independent. If the demand f is much smaller
than the total trading volume of the electricity market, then this assumption
would be valid.
The expectation value of procuring electricity in the day-ahead market is
E[C1] = E[(g +A)a]
= E[a](E[g] +A) . (5)
Next, we obtain the expectation value of procuring electricity in the intra-
day market, C2. For this purpose, we first rewrite C2 in terms of G and H:
C2 = δ(g +A ≤ h+B)(h+B − g −A)
= δ(A−B ≤ G−H)(G−H −A+B)b . (6)
From this, we obtain
E[C2] = E[b]
∫ ∞
−∞
δ(A−B ≤ x)(x−A+B)
∫ ∞
−∞
PG(x+ y)PH(y)dydx
= E[b]
∫ ∞
A−B
(x−A+B)
∫ ∞
−∞
PG(x+ y)PH(y)dydx
= E[b]
∫ ∞
A−B
(x−A+B)PG−H(x)dx . (7)
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Finally, we obtain the expectation value of the penalty, C3, similarly to that
of C2. First, we rewrite C3 in terms of G and H:
C3 = δ(g +A ≤ h+B ≤ f)(f − h−B)c
+ δ(h+B < g +A ≤ f)(f − g −A)c
= δ(g − f +A−B ≤ h− f ≤ −B)(H −B)c
+ δ(h− f −A+B < g − f ≤ −A)(G−A)c
= δ(B ≤ H ≤ G−A+B)(H −B)c
+ δ(A ≤ G < H +A−B)(G−A)c . (8)
We then immediately obtain
E[C3] = E[c]
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ ∞
−∞
δ(B ≤ x ≤ y −A+B)(x−B)PH(x)PG(y)dxdy
+ E[c]
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ ∞
−∞
δ(A ≤ x < y +A−B)(x−A)PG(x)PH(y)dxdy
= E[c]
∫ ∞
A
∫ y−A+B
B
(x−B)PH(x)PG(y)dxdy
+ E[c]
∫ ∞
B
∫ y+A−B
A
(x−A)PG(x)PH(y)dxdy . (9)
We have thus obtained the following expression for the expectation value
of total cost C for electricity to be delivered in the t-th period on the day of
delivery:
E [C] = E[C1] + E[C2] + E[C3]
= E[a](E[g] +A)
+ E[b]
∫ ∞
A−B
(x−A+B)PG−H(x)dx
+ E[c]
∫ ∞
A
∫ y−A+B
B
(x−B)PH(x)PG(y)dxdy
+ E[c]
∫ ∞
B
∫ y+A−B
A
(x−A)PG(x)PH(y)dxdy . (10)
Then, we know that the values of A and B that minimise E[C] depend on
E[a], E[b], E[c], PG(x) and PH(y); that is, even if we do not know the predictions
g and h, we can determine the values of A and B that minimise E[C] if we know
the prediction error distributions PG(x) and PH(y).
3.4 E[C] in the case that G and H are normally distributed
In this subsection, we seek the expectation value of the procurement cost E[C]
in the case that the errors in the demand predictions, G and H, are normally
distributed random variables with mean zero.
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We assume that the difference between the previous-day demand prediction
and actual demand G is normally distributed, with mean zero and variance
σ1(t)
2 = σ21 , and that the difference between the same-day demand prediction
and actual demand H is normally distributed, with mean zero and variance
σ2(t)
2 = σ22 . Then, σ
2 = σ(t)2 = σ1(t)
2 + σ2(t)
2 , the expectation value of C2
is expressed as
E[C2] = E[b]
∫ ∞
A−B
(x−A+B)PG−H(x)dx
=
E[b]√
2piσ2
∫ ∞
0
x exp
(
− (x+A−B)
2
2σ2
)
dx , (11)
and the expectation value of C3 is expressed as
E[C3] = E[c]
∫ ∞
A
∫ y−A+B
B
(x−B)PH(x)PG(y)dxdy
+ E[c]
∫ ∞
B
∫ y+A−B
A
(x−A)PG(x)PH(y)dxdy
=
E[c]
2piσ1σ2
∫ ∞
A
∫ y−A+B
B
(x−B) exp
(
− x
2
2σ22
)
exp
(
− y
2
2σ21
)
dxdy
+
E[c]
2piσ1σ2
∫ ∞
B
∫ y+A−B
A
(x−A) exp
(
− x
2
2σ21
)
exp
(
− y
2
2σ22
)
dxdy .
(12)
We thus have the following result for the expectation value of the procurement
cost:
E[C] = E[a](f +A) +
E[b]√
2piσ2
∫ ∞
0
x exp
(
− (x+A−B)
2
2σ2
)
dx
+
E[c]
2piσ1σ2
∫ ∞
A
∫ y−A+B
B
(x−B) exp
(
− x
2
2σ22
)
exp
(
− y
2
2σ21
)
dxdy
+
E[c]
2piσ1σ2
∫ ∞
B
∫ y+A−B
A
(x−A) exp
(
− x
2
2σ21
)
exp
(
− y
2
2σ22
)
dxdy . (13)
Because determining an analytical solution to E[C] is difficult, we use nu-
merical calculation, such as numerical integration and Monte Carlo simulation.
4 Numerical calculation of the expectation value
of the procurement cost
In this section, we assume that the errors in the demand predictions are normally
distributed random variables with mean zero. First, in Subsection 4.1, we
report the results of numerical computations in which, under fixed procurement
conditions, we determine the values of parameters A and B that minimise E[C].
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Next, in Subsection 4.2, we report the results of Monte Carlo simulations in
which we determine the variance of C, V [C]. We determine that the values
of A and B that minimise E[C] also yield a relatively small value for V [C].
Thus, we observe that by carefully choosing the procurement amounts, we can
both minimise the expectation value of the procurement cost and increase its
stability.
4.1 Numerical calculation of E[C]
With the procurement conditions fixed as
f = 100, σ1 =
√
3, σ2 =
√
2, E[a] = 1, E[b] = 2, E[c] = 3 , (14)
we conducted numerical computations in which we determined the expectation
value of C = C1 + C2 + C3.
First, we explain why we chose the above conditions.
We chose the value
√
3 for the standard deviation σ1 because, among electric
companies, the target level of precision for the previous-day demand prediction is
within ±3% [12, p. 53]. Then, because the precision of the same-day prediction
is generally higher, we chose the value σ2 =
√
2. Next, for the expectation value
of the unit price of the penalty, we chose E[c] = 3 because this unit price is
often three times or more greater than the day-ahead unit price [11, p. 425].1
Finally, for E[b], we simply used the average of E[a] and E[c]. In the appendix,
we consider variations of these conditions.
VaryingA over the range [−1.9, 3] andB over the range [−4.9, 0], we obtained
the plot of (A,B,E[C]) shown in Figure 1. In this plot, the A axis points along
the 10 o’clock direction and the B axis points along the 1 o’clock direction.
Data points were calculated at intervals of 0.1 along each axis. For each graph
presented in this paper, the orientation of the A and B axes are the same.
Additionally, each graph is plotted using data obtained for each (A,B) on a
grid of mesh size 0.1× 0.1.
Considering the nature of the procurement method, it is clear that suffi-
ciently far from (A,B) = (0, 0), the expectation value of the procurement cost
E[C] is large and increases as we move further away. Thus, we conclude that we
can determine the values of A and B that minimise E[C] by considering only
the neighbourhood of (A,B) = (0, 0).
Performing the numerical calculation to minimise E[C], in accordance with
the conditions stated above, we found that it was minimised at (A,B) =
(0.6,−2), with a minimum value of E[C] ≈ 101.835. It is interesting to compare
this with the value of E[C] obtained if the amounts procured in the two mar-
kets are simply those given by the predictions, g and h (i.e., the case in which
A = B = 0.) In this case, E[C] ≈ 102.329.
From the above results, we observe that with the procurement conditions
given above, we can reduce E[C] by procuring slightly more than the amount
1In the electricity industry, the quantity that we refer to as the “penalty” is often referred
to as the “imbalance fee;” this is the term used in Ref. [11].
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Figure 1: Expectation value of the pro-
curement cost E[C].
Figure 2: Variance of the procurement
cost V [C].
of the previous-day demand prediction and slightly less than the amount of the
same-day demand prediction.
4.2 Stability of E[C]
Generally, even if we have a method to minimise the expectation value of the
procurement cost, this method is not practically useful when the convergence to
the expectation value is slow due to the variance of the cost is too large. This
is because it entails a large financial risk for companies to use this procurement
method when procurement costs continue to be greater than their expected
values even if it is a short term. In the previous subsection, we reported the
values of A and B for which the minimum value of E[C] is achieved. In this
subsection, we investigate the unbiased variance of C, V [C], achieved using
these values of A and B. Through this investigation, we determine that not
only do these values minimise E[C], but they also result in a relatively small
value of V [C].
First, we conducted 106 iterations of a Monte Carlo simulation of the pro-
curement process for each value of (A,B) on a grid of mesh size 0.1×0.1. From
these simulations, we obtained the variance that corresponded to each such value
of (A,B). We note that these simulations use equation (2), (6) and (8). Here,
we do not use the equation (13).
The conditions of the simulations were set as follows:
f = 100, σ1 =
√
3, σ2 =
√
2, a = 1, b = 2, c = 3 . (15)
For the previous-day and same-day demand predictions, we used normal distri-
butions with mean 0:
G ∼ N (0, σ21), H ∼ N (0, σ22) . (16)
The results of the simulations, (A,B, V [C]), are plotted in Fig. 2, with values
of A in the range [−1.9, 3] and values of B in the range [−4.9, 0].
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We study the dependence of C on A and B, and for this reason, we express
this dependence explicitly by writing C as C(A,B).
In the range of values of (A,B) considered in our simulations, the vari-
ance was minimised at (A,B) = (1,−1.4), and the value was V [C(1,−1.4)] =
1.693098. This value should be compared with the values of the variance at (0, 0)
and (0.6,−2), where E[C] is minimised: V [C(0, 0)] = 2.879739; V [C(0.6,−2)] =
1.821432. Thus, the variance achieved when electricity was procured by simply
following the demand prediction was 1.7 times larger than the minimum value,
whereas that achieved for the values of A and B that minimised E[C] was only
1.07 times larger than the minimum value.
Figures 3 and 4 show histograms of the simulation results for C(A,B) ob-
tained in the cases (A,B) = (0, 0) and (0.6,−2).
Figure 3: Histogram for C(0, 0). Figure 4: Histogram for C(0.6,−2).
From the above results, we determine that with the proposed method, and
under the procurement conditions stated above, we were able to purchase elec-
tricity with a more stable price than in the case that procurement was made
simply in accordance with demand predictions. This effect can be understood
as resulting from a suppression of the penalty paid because of an increase in the
amount of electricity procured in the day-ahead market. Additionally, as can
be observed in Fig. 2, when A was large, the value of B had almost no effect
on the variance of C. This can be understood as resulting from the fact that
because there is little difference between the variances of the previous-day and
same-day predictions, it is usually possible to procure the necessary electricity
in the day-ahead market.
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5 Simulations using actual data
In this section, we report the results of simulations of the proposed procurement
method using actual data. From these simulations, we determine that this
method minimises the procurement cost. We use kilowatt-hours (kWh) as the
unit of electricity and Japanese yen as the unit of cost.
The data presented in Table 2 are the actual values of demand f(t, d) ex-
perienced by a particular facility in Kasuga City, Fukuoka Prefecture, on 19
weekdays corresponding to the values d = 1 to 19, in January 2017 (days 1–3
correspond to January 4 to January 6, days 4–7 correspond to January 10 to
January 13, days 8–12 correspond to January 16 to January 20, days 13–17
correspond to January 23 to January 27 and days 18–19 correspond to January
30 to January 31) for the periods t = 20 to t = 26 (from 9:30 a.m. to 1:00 p.m.)
We limit the time zone from t = 20 to t = 26 because the prediction errors of
this time zones are large.
Figure 5: Actual vs. predicted data (d = 10).
In actual electricity markets, in the day-ahead market, the unit of traded
electricity is 500 kWh [4, p. 7], whereas in the intra-day market, it is 50 kWh
[4, p. 12]. However, these units of traded electricity are larger than the demand
of the facility. Therefore, in this paper, we assume the scenario in which the
amount of electricity traded in the markets can be freely adjusted and smaller
amounts can be traded.
Previous-day predictions g(t, d) and same-day predictions (made 90 minutes
before each time period in question) h(t, d) for the actual demands are presented
in Tables 3 and 4.
In Tables 5, 6 and 7, we present day-ahead market unit prices a(t, d), intra-
day market unit prices b(t, d) and penalty unit prices c(t, d) for the same days
12
and time periods as in the previous tables. The prices listed are the area prices
for the Kyushu region. Additionally, for each intra-day unit price b(t, d), we use
the average price during the intra-day market for this time period. These data
were obtained from the JEPX website on January 31, 2018.
Figure 6: Unit prices (d = 1).
To derive the optimal values of A and B, we need predictions of the unit
prices and error distributions for the demand predictions. However, we do not
presently have a systematic method for generating predictions of unit prices. For
example, there is research on price prediction [1]; however, the trading method of
JEPX changes frequently, which causes fluctuations in prices, so price prediction
does not apply to recent data.
Instead, we use the following simple prescription for the predictions of the
day-ahead unit price aˆ(t, d), intra-day unit price bˆ(t, d) and penalty unit price
cˆ(t, d). For the time periods 20–24, we use
xˆ(d) =
1
5
∑
20≤t≤24
x(t, d) , (17)
and for the time periods 25 and 26, we use
xˆ(t) =
1
19
∑
1≤d≤19
x(t, d) , (18)
where x represents a, b and c. We chose these prescriptions for the predictions
because, as can be observed from the Tables 5–7 listing actual prices, the prices
during the time periods 20–24 vary significantly from day to day, whereas the
prices in periods 25 and 26 do not. The predictions obtained in this manner for
each time period are presented in Tables 8, 9 and 10.
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For the distribution functions of the errors in the demand predictions, we
use normal distributions with mean zero. Typically, the demand prediction
is performed using normal linear regression modelling. In particular, least-
squares estimation (LSE) produces a distribution of the prediction error whose
mean value is zero because the LSE yields an unbiased estimate of the mean of
prediction value.
In practice, the values of A and B are determined before the trade in both
day-ahead and intra-day markets. Because both A and B depend on the distri-
butions of the prediction error, these distributions must be estimated before the
trade in the two markets. However, the prediction in the intra-day market is
performed after the trade in the day-ahead markets; hence, the distribution of
the prediction error in the intra-day market cannot be obtained before the trade
in the day-ahead market. Therefore, we need to estimate the distribution of the
prediction error without the prediction in the intra-day market to determine the
values of A and B.
The estimates of the variances of the prediction error are given as follows: For
time periods 20–24, to estimate the error variance in the previous-day prediction
Vˆ1(t, d), we use the variance of the predicted values of linear regression [5]. As
an estimator of the variance of the prediction error in the same-day prediction,
we use
Vˆ2(t) =
1
19
∑
1≤d≤19
(f(t, d)− h(t, d))2 . (19)
We present the estimates of the variances obtained in Tables 11 and 12.
Using the above values for the predictions of unit prices aˆ(t, d), bˆ(t, d) and
cˆ(t, d), and the variances of the errors in the demand predictions Vˆ1(t, d) and
Vˆ2(t), we numerically determined the values of A and B that minimised E[C].
However, in the case bˆ ≤ aˆ, we choseA = 0, and in the case cˆ ≤ bˆ, we choseB = 0
to maintain the planned-value power balancing system because procuring large
amounts of electricity in the intra-day market or at the time of delivery places
a great burden on power generation facilities, and hence is not a maintainable
market scenario.
Employing the optimised values of A and B that appear in Tables 13 and 14,
and performing the procurement simulations, we obtained a total procurement
cost of 51, 949.95 yen. We compared this cost with those obtained in two other
scenarios. First, if the previous-day prediction of the demand was perfect and
we procured all the electricity in the day-ahead market, then we would obtain a
total procurement cost of 51, 140.72 yen. Second, using the actual predictions g
and h, if we simply procured electricity in accordance with these predictions (i.e.,
always using (A,B) = (0, 0)), we would have a procurement cost of 52, 225.97
yen. Thus, the procurement cost achieved with our method was 809.23 yen
higher than in the ideal case of perfect demand prediction and 276.02 yen lower
than in the case that the ordinary procurement method was followed. This result
show that the procurement cost can be reduced by about 0.5%. It is important
to reduce the procurement cost by 0.5% for electric power companies.
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With the assumption that individual procurements can be made in any
amount, the simulations conducted using actual data demonstrated that our
method minimised the procurement cost. Because the simulation time was short
and the simulation scale was small, the cost reduction was small. But, if the
simulation time was long and the simulation scale was large, then a significant
cost reduction could be expected.
6 Conclusion
We formulated a method for minimising the expected procurement cost of elec-
tricity and we reported the results of simulations of the proposed procurement
method using actual data. From these simulations, we found that this method
minimised the procurement cost. Based on the above discussion, to reduce the
procurement cost it was necessary to estimate not only the accuracy of predic-
tions but also the prediction error distributions. In this paper, the prediction
error distributions were assumed to be normal distributions, but the actual pre-
diction errors did not always become normal distributions. To achieve further
cost reduction, an estimation of the prediction error distributions is indispens-
able.
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Appendix: Simulations investigating the effect
of altering the procurement condi-
tions
In this appendix, we consider a variation of the conditions (14) given in Sub-
section 4.2. Using various combinations of the values of the quantities in the
conditions (14), we again conducted 106 iterations of the Monte Carlo simula-
tion for a range of values of (A,B). We plot the results for E[C] and V [C],
and then discuss how the value of (A,B) that minimises E[C] varies with the
variation of these conditions.
First, we consider the case in which the procurement conditions are as in
the conditions (14), except that σ1 is changed from
√
3 to 5. This increase in
σ1 represents a decrease in the precision of the previous-day demand prediction.
The results of these simulations are displayed in Figs. 7 and 8. As in the previous
case, data are plotted for A ∈ [−1.9, 3] and B ∈ [−4.9, 0].
Figure 7: Expectation value of the pro-
curement cost E[C].
Figure 8: Variance of the procurement
cost V [C].
In the present case, E[C] was minimised at (A,B) = (0.8,−1) and V [C] was
minimised at (A,B) = (1,−0.4). Below, we compare E[C] and V [C] for these
two values of (A,B) and (A,B) = (0, 0):
E[C(0.8,−1)] = 104.6559, V [C(0.8,−1)] = 10.32363,
E[C(1,−0.4)] = 104.7144, V [C(1,−0.4)] = 10.15707,
E[C(0, 0)] = 104.872, V [C(0, 0)] = 10.66363.
Using the parameter values A = 0.6 and B = −2, which were the optimal
parameter values found using the procurement conditions given in Section 4.2,
as standards for comparison, we found that as the precision of the previous-day
demand prediction decreased, it was advantageous to increase both A and B.
Next, we consider the case in which the procurement conditions are as in
the conditions (14), except that σ2 is changed from
√
2 to 0.1. This change
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represents an increase in the precision of the same-day demand prediction. The
results for E[C] and V [C] obtained from these simulations are displayed in
Figs. 9 and 10. Data are displayed for A ∈ [−1.9, 3] and B ∈ [−1.9, 3].
Figure 9: Expectation value of the pro-
curement cost E[C].
Figure 10: Variance of the procurement
cost V [C].
In this case, E[C] was minimised at (A,B) = (0.1,−0.1), whereas V [C] was
minimised at (A,B) = (0.1, 0). Below, we compare E[C] and V [C] for these
values of (A,B) and (A,B) = (0, 0):
E[C(0.1,−0.1)] = 101.441, V [C(0.1,−0.1)] = 1.101092,
E[C(0.1, 0)] = 101.4411, V [C(0.1, 0)] = 1.096553,
E[C(0, 0)] = 101.4415, V [C(0, 0)] = 1.097618.
Thus, we observe that when the precision of the same-day demand prediction
improved, it was advantageous to decrease A and increase B from their standard
values.
As the next scenario, we consider the case in which the procurement con-
ditions are as in the conditions (14), except that the intra-day unit price b is
decreased from 2 to 1.2. In Figs. 11 and 12, the results of these simulations for
E[C] and V [C] are plotted for A ∈ [−1.9, 3] and B ∈ [−2.9, 2].
In this case, E[C] was minimised at (A,B) = (−0.1,−0.5), and V [C] was
minimised at (A,B) = (−0.1, 0). Below, we compare E[C] and V [C] for these
values of (A,B) and (A,B) = (0, 0):
E[C(−0.1,−0.5)] = 101.5671, V [C(−0, 1,−0.5)] = 1.24487,
E[C(−0.1, 0)] = 101.608, V [C(−0.1, 0)] = 1.178014,
E[C(0, 0)] = 101.6139, V [C(0, 0)] = 1.179224.
Thus, we observe that when the procurement cost in the intra-day market
decreased and approached that in the day-ahead market, it was advantageous
to decrease A and increase B from their standard values.
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Figure 11: Expectation value of the pro-
curement cost E[C].
Figure 12: Variance of the procurement
cost V [C].
As the fourth scenario for comparison, we now consider the case in which the
procurement conditions are as in the conditions (14), except that intra-day unit
price b is increased from 2 to 2.8. The results of these simulations are displayed
in Figs. 13 and 14 for A ∈ [−1.9, 3] and B ∈ [−4.9, 0].
Figure 13: Expectation value of the pro-
curement cost E[C].
Figure 14: Variance of the procurement
cost V [C].
In this case, E[C] was minimised at (A,B) = (0.7,−3.8) and V [C] was
minimised at (A,B) = (1.2,−2.2). Below, we compare E[C] and V [C] for these
values of (A,B) and (A,B) = (0, 0):
E[C(0.7,−3.8)] = 101.8878, V [C(0.7,−3.8)] = 2.1443,
E[C(1.2,−2.2)] = 101.9767, V [C(1.2,−2.2)] = 1.946507,
E[C(0, 0)] = 102.2913, V [C(0, 0)] = 2.837869.
Thus, we observe that when the intra-day unit price increased and ap-
proached the penalty cost, it was advantageous to increase A and decrease B
20
from their standard values.
As the fifth scenario, we consider the case in which the procurement condi-
tions are as in the conditions (14), except that the day-ahead unit price a de-
creases from 1 to 0.5. The results of these simulations are displayed in Figs. 15
and 16 for A ∈ [−0.9, 3] and B ∈ [−4.9, 0].
Figure 15: Expectation value of the pro-
curement cost E[C].
Figure 16: Variance of the procurement
cost V [C].
In this case, E[C] was minimised at (A,B) = (1.6,−2.5) and V [C] was
minimised at (A,B) = (3.1,−1.7). Below, we compare E[C] and V [C] for these
values of (A,B) and (A,B) = (0, 0):
E[C(1.6,−2.5)] = 51.2869, V [C(1.6,−2.5)] = 1.158393,
E[C(3.1,−1.7)] = 51.6331, V [C(3.1,−1.7)] = 0.6809917,
E[C(0, 0)] = 52.32754, V [C(0, 0)] = 4.606727.
Thus, we observe that when the day-ahead unit price decreased, it was ad-
vantageous to increase A and decrease B from their standard values.
As the sixth scenario, we consider the case in which the procurement con-
ditions are as in the conditions (14), except that penalty unit price c increases
from 3 to 3.5. The results of these simulations are displayed in Figs. 17 and 18
for A ∈ [−1.9, 3] and B ∈ [−4.9, 0].
In this case, E[C] was minimised at (A,B) = (0.8,−1.6) and V [C] was
minimised at (A,B) = (1.2,−1). Below, we compare E[C] and V [C] for these
values of (A,B) and (A,B) = (0, 0):
E[C(0.8,−1.6)] = 101.9741, V [C(0.8,−1.6)] = 2.080493,
E[C(1.2,−1)] = 102.0595, V [C(1.2,−1)] = 1.873814,
E[C(0, 0)] = 102.4181, V [C(0, 0)] = 3.049496.
Thus, we observe that when the penalty unit price increased, it was advan-
tageous to increase A and decrease B from their standard values.
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Figure 17: Expectation value of the pro-
curement cost E[C].
Figure 18: Variance of the procurement
cost V [C].
In Table 1, we summarise the changes undergone by the optimal values of A
and B relative to their standard values because of the various types of changes
to the procurement conditions considered above.
A B
precision of previous-day demand prediction decreases increase increase
precision of same-day demand prediction increases decrease increase
intra-day unit price approaches day-ahead unit price decrease increase
intra-day unit price approaches penalty unit price increase decrease
day-ahead unit price decreases increase decrease
penalty unit price increases increase increase
Table 1: Changes in optimal values of A and B with respect to their standard values.
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t\d 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19
20 28 31 31 33 35 35 35 35 36 34 34 37 36 37 35 35 37 35 33
21 28 30 31 34 34 35 36 35 39 33 33 38 34 36 33 36 37 36 33
22 29 31 33 35 35 35 34 36 38 35 34 38 34 38 34 36 37 35 34
23 30 31 33 34 34 34 34 35 38 33 35 37 34 36 35 35 38 34 32
24 29 30 32 35 32 35 33 35 38 33 33 36 33 36 35 35 36 35 33
25 27 26 28 31 30 32 31 32 34 30 31 33 32 32 33 35 35 31 31
26 28 27 27 33 32 32 33 34 34 30 33 38 32 32 32 34 37 30 32
Table 2: Data for actual demand.
t\d 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19
20 33 32 32 32 32 32 33 33 33 33 34 34 34 34 35 35 36 36 36
21 32 32 31 32 32 32 33 33 33 34 34 34 34 34 35 35 36 36 36
22 31 31 31 32 32 33 33 33 33 34 34 34 35 35 35 36 36 36 36
23 32 31 31 32 32 33 33 33 33 34 34 34 34 34 35 35 36 36 36
24 31 31 31 31 31 32 32 32 33 33 33 33 34 34 34 35 35 36 36
25 29 29 28 28 29 29 30 30 30 31 31 31 31 32 32 33 33 34 34
26 29 30 29 29 30 30 30 31 31 31 32 32 33 33 33 33 34 34 34
Table 3: Previous-day predictions of demand.
t\d 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19
20 33 29 31 34 34 34 32 36 34 35 33 32 37 36 35 36 34 37 34
21 32 30 30 34 33 33 33 35 34 36 33 34 36 34 35 34 35 37 36
22 31 30 32 33 34 33 34 36 35 34 35 35 36 35 36 35 36 37 34
23 32 32 31 33 34 33 33 34 35 35 33 36 35 35 34 35 36 36 34
24 31 31 31 33 33 32 34 32 36 32 33 36 33 34 33 36 36 35 34
25 29 29 28 29 30 30 30 31 32 31 30 33 30 34 30 34 35 34 32
26 29 29 29 29 31 31 31 32 34 30 32 33 34 33 32 33 35 34 31
Table 4: Same-day predictions of demand.
t\d 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19
20 7.75 12.85 11.63 11.63 11.63 11.63 15.00 20.00 15.12 15.01 12.98 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 17.00 13.00 15.39 13.75
21 7.49 12.32 11.10 11.63 10.36 11.10 11.63 17.29 14.09 13.50 11.63 16.38 17.08 15.00 17.24 11.95 12.16 20.00 11.63
22 6.11 11.93 11.10 8.90 9.70 10.33 11.63 11.63 12.20 13.00 10.56 15.00 15.00 13.00 15.00 11.75 11.63 20.00 11.62
23 6.11 11.63 9.57 8.68 9.70 11.10 11.29 11.63 10.81 11.63 10.21 13.00 12.90 11.63 12.42 10.59 11.33 15.02 9.94
24 5.94 8.79 9.57 8.62 9.68 9.90 10.36 11.63 11.48 11.60 10.21 13.00 12.48 11.63 12.42 10.06 10.65 13.26 8.78
25 5.91 8.68 8.16 7.40 8.27 8.44 8.27 8.83 8.97 9.07 8.68 11.63 9.89 9.89 10.06 8.05 9.89 8.93 7.42
26 5.91 8.68 7.52 7.33 8.27 8.44 8.27 8.20 8.83 8.83 8.57 11.63 9.13 8.80 10.06 7.74 8.98 8.57 7.34
Table 5: Day-ahead market unit prices.
t\d 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19
20 7.11 11.58 11.33 10.27 10.97 11.05 13.42 19.34 14.27 14.57 12.41 20.92 15.68 21.93 17.14 19.19 12.52 15.17 13.64
21 7.25 11.33 11.05 9.92 9.65 10.02 10.27 15.41 13.77 13.44 10.65 18.72 15.25 15.55 15.40 12.61 12.11 18.30 11.45
22 6.81 11.26 10.48 8.32 9.75 9.90 10.53 11.66 12.47 12.73 9.88 17.99 13.45 14.15 13.33 11.87 11.50 18.00 10.69
23 6.74 11.46 9.74 8.32 9.61 10.04 10.49 11.24 10.43 10.44 9.93 15.50 12.74 12.03 11.73 10.03 10.79 14.66 9.43
24 6.20 7.43 9.80 8.12 9.62 9.66 9.28 10.17 10.61 9.97 9.82 15.94 12.41 11.89 11.67 9.63 10.16 13.94 8.42
25 5.84 8.34 9.31 7.60 8.41 8.57 8.53 9.49 9.10 8.61 8.52 13.59 9.79 9.54 10.34 7.90 9.59 7.75 8.31
26 5.76 8.20 8.51 7.62 8.34 8.41 8.55 9.23 8.68 8.45 8.47 13.64 9.42 9.46 9.88 7.89 8.86 8.62 8.04
Table 6: Intra-day market unit prices.
t\d 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19
20 8.16 10.29 16.48 10.79 10.17 11.75 11.20 19.87 12.36 12.95 13.22 20.35 14.36 16.13 11.66 13.08 16.50 16.74 10.87
21 8.00 12.46 12.82 9.77 9.52 10.39 10.37 13.70 11.83 11.83 12.20 19.70 14.37 13.07 11.68 11.85 18.45 19.11 10.87
22 7.87 10.34 10.41 9.80 9.96 10.91 10.41 12.19 11.08 9.72 11.21 20.44 13.96 11.85 10.68 10.05 13.16 13.24 9.74
23 7.83 9.82 9.74 9.07 10.28 11.85 10.91 10.92 10.91 8.97 10.95 13.55 14.05 13.10 11.58 8.89 9.47 13.52 10.21
24 7.76 9.96 9.29 8.99 9.97 11.89 10.88 10.55 10.62 9.10 9.75 13.52 13.64 13.14 9.88 8.87 9.17 12.10 9.68
25 7.66 10.99 8.74 8.83 9.02 10.23 10.34 9.75 9.84 9.01 8.96 10.86 11.60 12.01 9.70 8.75 9.07 8.88 9.33
26 7.59 11.09 8.75 8.88 9.02 9.74 11.06 9.74 9.62 8.75 8.94 10.86 11.42 11.57 9.53 8.65 8.92 8.45 8.91
Table 7: Penalty unit prices.
23
t\d 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19
20–24 6.68 11.50 10.59 9.89 10.21 10.81 11.98 14.44 12.74 12.95 11.12 15.48 15.49 14.25 15.42 12.27 11.75 16.73 11.14
t\d 1–19
25 8.76
26 8.47
Table 8: Predictions of the day-ahead unit prices.
t\d 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19
20–24 6.82 10.61 10.48 8.99 9.92 10.13 10.80 13.56 12.31 12.23 10.54 17.81 13.91 15.11 13.85 12.67 11.42 16.01 10.73
t\d 1–19
25 8.90
26 8.73
Table 9: Predictions of the intra-day unit prices.
t\d 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19
20–24 7.92 10.57 11.75 9.68 9.98 11.36 10.75 13.45 11.36 10.51 11.47 17.51 14.08 13.46 11.10 10.55 13.35 14.94 10.27
t\d 1–19
25 9.66
26 9.55
Table 10: Predictions of the penalty unit prices.
t\d 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19
20 10.48 9.41 8.46 7.64 6.95 6.38 5.94 5.63 5.44 5.37 5.44 5.63 5.94 6.38 6.95 7.64 8.46 9.41 10.48
21 13.29 11.93 10.73 9.69 8.81 8.09 7.53 7.13 6.89 6.81 6.89 7.13 7.53 8.09 8.81 9.69 10.73 11.93 13.29
22 10.7 9.6 8.64 7.8 7.09 6.51 6.06 5.74 5.55 5.48 5.55 5.74 6.06 6.51 7.09 7.8 8.64 9.6 10.7
23 9.29 8.34 7.5 6.78 6.16 5.66 5.27 4.99 4.82 4.76 4.82 4.99 5.27 5.66 6.16 6.78 7.5 8.34 9.29
24 10.05 9.02 8.11 7.33 6.66 6.12 5.7 5.39 5.21 5.15 5.21 5.39 5.7 6.12 6.66 7.33 8.11 9.02 10.05
25 9.29 8.34 7.5 6.78 6.16 5.66 5.27 4.99 4.82 4.76 4.82 4.99 5.27 5.66 6.16 6.78 7.5 8.34 9.29
26 14.69 13.19 11.86 10.72 9.74 8.95 8.33 7.89 7.62 7.53 7.62 7.89 8.33 8.95 9.74 10.72 11.86 13.19 14.69
Table 11: Estimated values of the variance of the error distributions for the previous-
day demand predictions.
t\d 1–19
20 4.74
21 5.84
22 3.05
23 2.42
24 2.36
25 3
26 4.63
Table 12: Estimated values of the variance of the error distributions for the same-day
demand predictions.
t\d 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19
20 -5.08 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -2.12 0 -3.7 0 -5 0 0 0
21 -5.75 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -2.42 0 -4.15 0 -5.62 0 0 0
22 -5.62 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -2.24 0 -3.73 0 -5.02 0 0 0
23 -5.31 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -2.08 0 -3.46 0 -4.68 0 0 0
24 -5.61 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -2.17 0 -3.64 0 -4.83 0 0 0
25 -5.74 -5.37 -5.02 -4.69 -4.4 -4.15 -3.95 -3.8 -3.71 -3.68 -3.71 -3.8 -3.95 -4.15 -4.4 -4.69 -5.02 -5.37 -5.74
26 -6.33 -5.91 -5.55 -5.21 -4.9 -4.65 -4.44 -4.27 -4.18 -4.15 -4.18 -4.27 -4.44 -4.65 -4.9 -5.21 -5.55 -5.91 -6.33
Table 13: Optimal values of A.
t\d 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19
20 -2.71 0 -4.53 -5.21 -7.3 -4.88 0 0 0 0 -5.48 0 -6.28 0 0 0 -4.02 0 0
21 -2.99 0 -4.99 -5.74 -8.96 -5.32 0 0 0 0 -6.03 0 -7.86 0 0 0 -4.48 0 0
22 -2.04 0 -3.22 -3.79 -5.57 -3.46 0 0 0 0 -4 0 -5.94 0 0 0 -2.93 0 0
23 -1.81 0 -2.84 -3.32 -4.86 -3.02 0 0 0 0 -3.45 0 -4.84 0 0 0 -2.54 0 0
24 -1.77 0 -2.77 -3.19 -4.77 -2.89 0 0 0 0 -3.34 0 -4.52 0 0 0 -2.46 0 0
25 -2.6 -2.63 -2.66 -2.69 -2.73 -2.76 -2.79 -2.81 -2.83 -2.84 -2.83 -2.81 -2.79 -2.76 -2.73 -2.69 -2.66 -2.63 -2.6
26 -3.2 -3.23 -3.27 -3.32 -3.36 -3.4 -3.44 -3.47 -3.49 -3.5 -3.49 -3.47 -3.44 -3.4 -3.36 -3.32 -3.27 -3.23 -3.2
Table 14: Optimal values of B.
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